

FICAM PACS

Master Test Procedures

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1 **1 Introduction**

2 **1.1 Test Scoring Guidelines**

3 The following scoring guidelines are used by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management
4 (FICAM) Test Lab for the FICAM Testing Program. There are two main families of test cases:

- 5 • **Security** - A control directly impacting security of the system.
- 6 • **Usability** - A control impacting end user system usability. Does not directly impact security.

7 For each test case evaluating a control (both Usability and Security), there are three possible
8 classifications:

- 9 • **Mandatory** - All mandatory controls must be present and must work correctly. They are reported as
10 **Red** (fail critical) / **Green** (pass).
- 11 • **Optional** - Always tested. They are reported as **Yellow** (fail not critical) / **Green** (pass).
- 12 • **Optional *** - These controls are part of the feature set of a given Product. They may be present. If
13 present, it must work correctly and will be reported as **Red** (fail critical) / **Green** (pass). If not
14 present, they will be reported as **Yellow** (fail not present).

15 The above scoring is done for each control test case for the FICAM Testing Program.

16 **1.2 System Under Test**

17 A full system tested by the FICAM Testing Program for a Physical Access Control System (PACS) includes
18 the following components:

Component	Component Code	Make	Model	Software/Firmware Version
Head-End Server	H			
PACS Panel	H			
Validation System	V			
Secure Controller	V			
Door Reader	R			

19

20

21 **1.3 Test Components**

22 The following cards are used in the FICAM Testing Program.

- 23 1. Live PIV and PIV-I cards from various issuers.
- 24 2. ICAM Test Cards (detailed in *Table 1*)
- 25 3. ICAM PKI infrastructure (detailed in *Table 2*).
- 26 4. NIST PIV Test Cards.
- 27 5. DoD JITC CAC Test Cards.
- 28 6. Full system under test, encompassing:
 - 29 a. Reader for Access;
 - 30 b. Validation System; and
 - 31 c. PACS Head-End.
- 32

33 **Table 1 - ICAM Test Cards Used in Test**

ICAM Test Cards	Description	Threat Type
1	Golden PIV	None
2	Golden PIV-I	None
3	Placeholder for ECC card	TBD
4	Tampered CHUID	Manipulated Data
5	Tampered PIV and Card Authentication Certificates	Manipulated Data
6	Tampered PHOTO	Manipulated Data
7	Tampered FINGERPRINT	Manipulated Data
8	Tampered SECURITY OBJECT	Manipulated Data
9	Expired CHUID signer	Invalid Date
10	Expired certificate signer	Invalid Date
11	PIV Authentication Certificate expiring after CHUID	Invalid Date
12	Authentication certificates valid in future	Invalid Date
13	Expired authentication certificates	Invalid Date
14	Expired CHUID	Invalid Date
15	Valid CHUID copied from one card to another (PIV)	Copied Credential
16	Valid Card Authentication Certificate copied from one card to another (PIV)	Copied Credential
17	Valid PHOTO copied from one card to another (PIV)	Copied Credential
18	Valid FINGERPRINT copied from one card to another (PIV)	Copied Credential
19	Valid CHUID copied from one card to another (PIV-I)	Copied Credential
20	Valid Card Authentication Certificate copied from one card to another (PIV-I)	Copied Credential
21	Valid PHOTO copied from one card to another (PIV-I)	Copied Credential
22	Valid FINGERPRINT copied from one card to another (PIV-I)	Copied Credential
23	Private and Public Key mismatch	No Trusted Path
24	Revoked authentication certificates	Revoked Credential

34

35 **1.4 PKI Used in Test**

36 The following PKI infrastructure is used for the FICAM Testing Program:

37 **Table 2 - PKI Used in Test**

Path Number	Fault description	Operational group
1	Invalid CA Signature	Manipulated Data
2	Invalid CA notBefore Date	Revoked/Date Invalid
3	Invalid CA notAfter Date	Revoked/Date Invalid
4	Invalid Name Chaining	Standards Conformant Processing
5	Missing Basic Constraints	Standards Conformant Processing
6	Invalid CA False Critical	Manipulated Data
7	Invalid CA False not Critical	Standards Conformant Processing
8	Invalid pathLenConstraint	Standards Conformant Processing
9	keyUsage keyCertSign not set	Standards Conformant Processing
10	keyUsage Not Critical	Standards Conformant Processing
11	keyUsage Critical cRLSign False	Standards Conformant Processing
12	Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping	Standards Conformant Processing
13	Invalid DN nameConstraints	Standards Conformant Processing
14	Invalid Subject Alternative Name	Standards Conformant Processing
15	Invalid Missing CRL	Standards Conformant Processing
16	Invalid Revoked CA	Revoked/Date Invalid
17	Invalid CRL Signature	Manipulated Data
18	Invalid CRL Issuer Name	Standards Conformant Processing
19	Invalid Old CRL nextUpdate	Revoked/Date Invalid
20	Invalid CRL notBefore Date	Revoked/Date Invalid
21	Invalid distributionPoint	Standards Conformant Processing
22	Valid requiredExplicitPolicy	Standards Conformant Processing
23	Invalid requiredExplicitPolicy	Standards Conformant Processing
24	Valid GeneralizedTime	PKI/Crypto Compatibility
25	Invalid GeneralizedTime	Standards Conformant Processing
26	ECC prime256v1	PKI/Crypto Compatibility
27	ECC secp384r1	PKI/Crypto Compatibility

Path Number	Fault description	Operational group
28	Invalid ECC Signature p256	Manipulated Data
29	Invalid Policy Mapping p256	Standards Conformant Processing
30	Invalid ECC Signature	Manipulated Data
31	Invalid Policy Mapping	Standards Conformant Processing
32	Invalid SKID	Standards Conformant Processing
33	Invalid AKID	Standards Conformant Processing
34	Invalid CRL format	Standards Conformant Processing
35	4096 RSA key	PKI/Crypto Compatibility

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39 **2 Authentication at Time of Registration Test Cases**

40 **2.1 Signature Verification**

41 Applications must be able to verify digital signatures on each certificate in the certification path using
 42 the public key from the previous certificate in the path. These test cases validate signatures in the
 43 certificates found in the certification path.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.1.1 Valid Signature PIV	H, V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures in the certificates found in the certification path for a PIV credential.	Card 1: PIV Golden Registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.1.2 Valid Signature PIV-I	H, V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures in the certificates found in the certification path for a PIV-I credential.	Card 2: PIV-I Golden Registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.1.3 Invalid CA Signature	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize invalid signature on an intermediate CA in the certification path.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 1 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.1.4 Invalid End Entity	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize invalid signature on the End Entity certificate.	Card 5: invalid PIV/Card Auth Signer fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

44

45 **2.2 Certificate Validity Periods**

46 The Product must verify notBefore time of each certificate to be earlier than or equal to the current
 47 time. The Product must also verify notAfter to time be to be later or equal to the current time. The
 48 following tests validate notBefore and notAfter values in each certificate in the path.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.2.1 Invalid CA notBefore Date	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when notBefore date of the intermediate CA certificate is sometime in the future.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 2 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.2.2 Invalid End Entity certificate notBefore Date	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when notBefore date of the End Entity certificate is sometime in the future.	Card 12: (Certs not yet valid) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.2.3 Invalid CA notAfter Date	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when notAfter date of the intermediate certificate is sometime in the past.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 3 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.2.4 Invalid End Entity certificate notAfter Date	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when notAfter date of the End Entity certificate is sometime in the past.	Card 13: (Certs Expired) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

49 **2.3 Name Chaining**

50 The purpose of the following test is to verify the Product's ability to check that names chain correctly
 51 within certification path.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.3.1 Invalid Name Chaining End Entity Certificate	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when common name portion of the of the issuer's name in the End Entity certificate does not match common name portion of subject's name in the previous intermediate certificate.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 4 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

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 53

54 **2.4 Basic Constraints Verification**

55 Test in this sections are used to verify that the Product correctly processes **basicConstraints** extension.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.4.1 Invalid Missing Basic Constraints	V	Verify Product’s ability to recognize when the intermediate CA certificate is missing basicConstraints extension.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 5 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.4.2 Invalid CA False Critical	V	Verify Product’s ability to recognize when the basicConstraints extension is present and critical in the intermediate CA certificate but the CA component is false.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 6 fails to register successfully.	Security - Optional
2.4.3 Invalid CA False not Critical	V	Verify Product’s ability to recognize when the basicConstraints extension is present and not critical in the intermediate CA certificate but the CA component is false.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 7 fails to register successfully.	Security - Optional
2.4.4 Invalid pathLenConstraint	V	Verify Product’s ability to recognize when the first certificate in the path includes basicConstraints extension with a pathLenConstraint of 0 (this prevents additional intermediate certificates from appearing in the path). The first certificate is followed by the second intermediate CA certificate and an End Entity certificate.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 8 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

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58 **2.5 Key Usage Verification**

59 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to correctly process keyUsage extension in a certificate
 60 when subject public key is to be used to verify signatures on certificates and CRLs.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.5.1 Invalid keyUsage Critical keyCertSign False	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize when the intermediate certificate includes a critical keyUsage extension in which keyCertSign is false.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 9 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.5.2 Valid keyUsage Not Critical	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize when the intermediate certificate includes a non-critical keyUsage extension.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 10 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.5.3 Invalid keyUsage Critical cRLSign False	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize when the intermediate certificate includes a critical keyUsage extension in which cRLSign is false.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 11 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

61 **2.6 Certificate Policies**

62 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to correctly process **certificatePolicies** extension.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.6.1 Explicit Certificate Policy Required and Present	V	With the trust anchor set to Commercial Root check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and present in the certificate path. The explicit policy will be set to PIV-I Hardware.	Production PIV-I registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.6.2 Explicit Certificate Policy Required and not Present	V	With the trust anchor set to Commercial Root check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and not present in the certificate path. The explicit policy will be set to an arbitrary value that is not present in the certificate path (e.g., OID value 1.2.3.4).	Production PIV-I fails to register.	Security – Mandatory
2.6.3 Explicit Certificate Policy Required Across Bridge and Present in End Entity Certificate	V	With the trust anchor set so the certificate path requires trust across the Commercial Bridge to Federal Common Policy CA, check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and present in the certificate in a bridged trust environment. The explicit policy will be set to PIV-I Hardware. Test Condition: production PIV-I passes.	Production PIV-I registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.6.4 Explicit Certificate Policy Required Across Bridge and not Present in End Entity Certificate	V	With the trust anchor set so the certificate path requires trust across the Commercial Bridge Federal Common Policy CA, check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and not present in the certificate in a bridged trust environment. The explicit policy will be set to an arbitrary value that is not present in the certificate chain (e.g., OID value 1.2.3.4).	Production PIV-I fails to register.	Security – Mandatory
2.6.5 Explicit Certificate Policy Required Across Bridge and Present in Path, but not Present in End Entity Certificate	V	With Federal Common Policy CA anchor, check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and not present in the certificate – however, is present somewhere in the certificate path. The explicit policy will be set to a value that is present in the certificate path, but does not map to the end entity certificate (e.g., High Hardware).	Production PIV-I fails to register.	Security – Mandatory

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65 **2.7 Inhibit Policy Mappings**

66 The test in this section verifies the application's ability to process the **inhibitPolicyMapping** field of the
 67 **policyConstraints** extension and to verify that policy mappings are processed correctly after policy
 68 mapping has been inhibited.

Test	Interface	Description	Test condition	Type
2.7.1 Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping	V	The first intermediate certificate asserts NIST-test-policy-1 and includes a policyConstraints extension with inhibitPolicyMapping set to 0. The second intermediate certificate asserts Policy A and maps Policy A to Policy B . The end entity certificate asserts Policy A and Policy B .	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 12 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

69 **2.8 Name Constraints**

70 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to correctly process **nameConstraints** extension.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.8.1 Valid DN nameConstraints	V	The system recognizes when the intermediate certificate includes a nameConstraints extension that specifies a single permitted subtree. The end entity certificate includes a subject name that falls within that subtree.	Card 1: (PIV Golden) access grant succeeds.	Security – Mandatory
2.8.2 Invalid DN nameConstraints	V	The system recognizes when the intermediate certificate includes a nameConstraints extension that specifies a single permitted subtree. The end entity certificate includes a subject name that falls outside that subtree.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 13 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.8.3 Invalid DN nameConstraints invalid SAN	V	The system recognizes when the intermediate certificate includes a nameConstraints extension that specifies a single permitted subtree. The end entity certificate includes a subject name that falls within that subtree and subjectAltName with a DN that falls outside that subtree.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 14 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

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73 **2.9 Certificate Revocation Tests (CRL)**

74 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to retrieve and process valid revocation data for each
 75 certificate in the path via CRL.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.9.1 Unavailable CRL	V	The system recognizes when no revocation information is available for the End Entity certificate.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 15 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.9.2 Revoked CA	V	The system recognizes when a second intermediate CA certificate is revoked.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 16 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.9.3 Revoked End Entity	V	The system recognizes when the End Entity certificate is revoked.	Card 24: (Revoked status) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.9.4 Invalid CRL Signature	V	The System Recognizes when a CRL Signature is Invalid.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 17 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.9.5 Invalid CRL Issuer Name	V	The system recognizes when a certificate in the path links to a CRL issued by a CA other than that which issued the certificate.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 18 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.9.6 Old CRL nextUpdate	V	The system recognizes when a certificate in the path points to a CRL with an expired nextUpdate value.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 19 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.9.7 Invalid notBefore Date	V	The system recognizes when a certificate in the path points to a CRL with a notBefore Date in the future.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 20 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.9.8 Invalid Distribution Point	V	The system recognizes when a certificate in the path has an incorrect distribution point.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 21 fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

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77

78 **2.10 CHUID Verification**

79 Tests in this section verify the system’s ability to correctly verify CHUID’s validity.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.10.1 Invalid CHUID signature	V	The system recognizes when the CHUID signature is invalid and does not verify.	Card 4: (Invalid CHUID Signature) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.10.2 Expired CHUID signer	V	The system recognizes when the CHUID signer certificate is expired.	Card 9: (Expired CHUID signer) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.10.3 Expired CHUID	V	The system recognizes when the CHUID is expired.	Card 14: (Card Expired) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.10.4 FASC-N != in CHUID	V	The system recognizes when the FASC-N in the CHUID does not equal the FASC-N in the PIV Auth Cert.	Card 15: (FASC-N in CHUID !=) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.10.5 UUID != in CHUID	V	The system recognizes when the UUID in the CHUID does not equal the UUID in the PIV Auth Cert.	Card 19: (UUID in CHUID !=) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

80 **2.11 Facial Image Verification**

81 The test in this section verifies the Product’s ability to correctly verify Facial Image object. Test cards
 82 use CHUID Signer Certificate for biometric objects.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.11.1 Invalid Facial Image signature	V	The system recognizes when the Facial Image signature is invalid and does not verify.	Card 6: (bad photo signature) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

83

84 **2.12 FINGERPRINT Verification**

85 Tests in this section verify the Product’s ability to correctly verify FINGERPRINT object. Test cards use
 86 CHUID Signer Certificate for biometric objects.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.12.1 Invalid Fingerprint signature	V	The system recognizes when the Fingerprint signature is invalid and does not verify.	Card 7: (bad fingerprint signature) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.12.2 Valid Bio	H, V	With fingerprint checking enabled, a good credential is presented to the system with a valid fingerprint.	PIV-I registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.12.3 Invalid Bio	H, V	With fingerprint checking enabled, a good credential is presented to the system with an invalid fingerprint.	PIV-I fails to register.	Security – Mandatory

87 **2.13 Security Object Verification**

88 The test in this section verifies the Product’s ability to correctly verify Security Object.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.13.1 Invalid Security Object signature	V	The system recognizes when the Security Object signature is invalid and does not verify.	Card 8: (bad security object signature) fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

89

90 **2.14 OCSF Response Checking**

91 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to validate OCSF responses.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.14.1 Good OCSF Signer	V	The system successfully validates a good credential using an OCSF response with a good signature.	Card 1: Golden PIV registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.14.2 Expired OCSF Signer	V	Validation fails using an OCSF response with an expired signature for a good card.	Card 1: Golden PIV fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.14.3 Revoked OCSF Signer with PKIX_OCSP_NOCHECK present	V	Validation succeeds using an OCSF response with a revoked signature for a good card with PKIX_OCSP_NOCHECK present.	Card 1: Golden PIV registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.14.4 Revoked OCSF Signer with PKIX_OCSP_NOCHECK not present	V	Validation fails using an OCSF response with a revoked signature for a good card without PKIX_OCSP_NOCHECK present.	Card 1: Golden PIV fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.14.5 Invalid OCSF Signer	V	Validation fails using an OCSF response with a malformed signature for a good card.	Card 1: Golden PIV fails to register successfully.	Security – Mandatory

92 **2.15 Interoperability Testing**

93 Tests in this section attempt to use a variety of dual interface production PIV and PIV-I cards in the
 94 system. The FICAM Testing Program will vary the selection of cards on an as needed basis.

95 **2.16 Cryptographic Testing**

96 Tests in this section attempt to confirm the solution's ability to handle all required cryptographic
 97 algorithms as specified in the Federal PKI Common Policy and NIST SP800-78-3.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.16.1 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (1024)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (1024).	NIST card#7 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.16.2 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048).	NIST card#1 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.16.3 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (3072)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (3072).	TBD	Security – Mandatory
2.16.4 RSASSA-PSS (1024)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSASSA-PSS (1024).	TBD (valid through 1/1/2014)	Security – Mandatory
2.16.5 RSASSA-PSS (2048)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSASSA-PSS (2048).	NIST card#2 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.16.6 RSASSA-PSS (3072)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSASSA-PSS (3072).	TBD	Security – Mandatory
2.16.7 RSA key transport (1024)	V		TBD (valid through 1/1/2014)	Security – Mandatory
2.16.8 RSA key transport (2048)	V		TBD	Security – Mandatory
2.16.9 RSA key transport (3072)	V		TBD	Security – Mandatory
2.16.10 ECDSA (P-256)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using ECDSA (P-256)	NIST card#4 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.16.11 ECDSA (P-384)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using ECDSA (P-384)	NIST card#5 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.16.12 ECDH (P-256)	V		TBD	Security – Mandatory
2.16.13 ECDH (P-384)	V		TBD	Security – Mandatory
2.16.14 SHA-1	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using SHA-1	NIST card#7 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.16.15 SHA-256	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using SHA-256	NIST card#1 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.16.16 SHA-384	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using SHA-384	NIST card#5 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.16.17 2TDEA	V	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using 2TDEA	TBD	Security - Optional*

Comment [FICAM1]: We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of industry solutions that use the KMK for PACS. Are there live use cases for this key?

Comment [FICAM2]: We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of industry solutions that use the KMK for PACS. Are there live use cases for this key?

Comment [FICAM3]: We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of industry solutions that use the KMK for PACS. Are there live use cases for this key?

Comment [FICAM4]: We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of industry solutions that use the KMK for PACS. Are there live use cases for this key?

Comment [FICAM5]: We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of industry solutions that use the KMK for PACS. Are there live use cases for this key?

Comment [FICAM6]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?

Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
2.16.18 3TDEA	v	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using 3TDEA	TBD	Security - Optional*
2.16.19 AES-128	v	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using AES-128	TBD	Security - Optional*
2.16.20 AES-192	v	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using AES-192	TBD	Security - Optional*
2.16.21 AES-256	v	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using AES-256	TBD	Security - Optional*
2.16.22 RSA key exponent 65,537 (2^16+1)	v	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048) w/exponent of 65,537.	NIST card#1 registers successfully.	Security – Mandatory
2.16.23 RSA key exponent (2^256-1)	v	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048) w/exponent of 2^256-1.	TBD	Security – Optional*

Comment [FICAM7]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?

Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

Comment [FICAM8]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?

Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

Comment [FICAM9]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?


Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

Comment [FICAM10]: These could also be tests for variants of TLS to OSCP responders. Would have to develop PKI services for this case for all algorithms.

Comment [FICAM11]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?

Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

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101



102 **3 Authentication at Time of Access Test Cases**

103 **3.1 Signature Verification**

104 Applications must be able to verify digital signatures on each certificate in the certification path using
 105 the public key from the previous certificate in the path. These test cases validate signatures in the
 106 certificates found in the certification path.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.1.1 Valid Signature PIV	H, V, R	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures in the certificates found in the certification path for a PIV credential.	Card 1: PIV Golden Receives an access grant Successfully.	Security – Mandatory
3.1.2 Valid Signatures PIV-I	H, V, R	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures in the certificates found in the certification path for a PIV-I credential.	Card 2: PIV-I Golden Receives an access grant Successfully.	Security – Mandatory
3.1.3 Invalid CA Signature	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize invalid signature on an intermediate CA in the certification path.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) with Path 1 fails to receive an access grant.	Security – Mandatory
3.1.4 Invalid End Entity	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize invalid signature on the End Entity certificate.	Card 5: invalid PIV/Card Auth Signer fails to receive an access grant.	Security – Mandatory

107

108 **3.2 Certificate Validity Periods**

109 The Product must verify notBefore time of each certificate to be earlier than or equal to the current
 110 time. The Product must also verify notAfter to time be to be later or equal to the current time. The
 111 following tests validate notBefore and notAfter values in each certificate in the path.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.2.1 Invalid CA notBefore Date	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when notBefore date of the intermediate CA certificate is sometime in the future.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 2.	Security – Mandatory
3.2.2 Invalid End Entity certificate notBefore Date	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when notBefore date of the End Entity certificate is sometime in the future.	Card 12: (Certs not yet valid) access grant fails.	Security – Mandatory
3.2.3 Invalid CA notAfter Date	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when notAfter date of the intermediate certificate is sometime in the past.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 3.	Security – Mandatory
3.2.4 Invalid End Entity certificate notAfter Date	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when notAfter date of the End Entity certificate is sometime in the past.	Card 13: (Certs Expired) access grant fails.	Security – Mandatory

112 **3.3 Name Chaining**

113 The purpose of the following test is to verify the Product's ability to check that names chain correctly
 114 within the certification path.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.3.1 Invalid Name Chaining End Entity Certificate	V	Verify Product's ability to reject a credential when common name portion of the of the issuer's name in the End Entity certificate does not match common name portion of subject's name in the previous intermediate certificate.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 4.	Security – Mandatory

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117 **3.4 Basic Constraints Verification**

118 Test in this section are used to verify that the Product correctly processes **basicConstraints** extension.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.4.1 Invalid Missing Basic Constraints	V	Verify Product’s ability to recognize when the intermediate CA certificate is missing basicConstraints extension.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 5.	Security – Mandatory
3.4.2 Invalid CA False Critical	V	Verify Product’s ability to recognize when the basicConstraints extension is present and critical in the intermediate CA certificate but the CA component is false.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 6.	Security – Optional
3.4.3 Invalid CA False not Critical	V	Verify Product’s ability to recognize when the basicConstraints extension is present and not critical in the intermediate CA certificate but the CA component is false.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 7.	Security – Optional
3.4.4 Invalid pathLenConstraint	V	Verify Product’s ability to recognize when the first certificate in the path includes basicConstraints extension with a pathLenConstraint of 0 (this prevents additional intermediate certificates from appearing in the path). The first certificate is followed by the second intermediate CA certificate and an End Entity certificate.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 8.	Security – Mandatory

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121 **3.5 Key Usage Verification**

122 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to correctly process keyUsage extension in a certificate
 123 when subject public key is to be used to verify signatures on certificates and CRLs.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.5.1 Invalid keyUsage Critical keyCertSign False	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize when the intermediate certificate includes a critical keyUsage extension in which keyCertSign is false.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 9.	Security – Mandatory
3.5.2 Valid keyUsage Not Critical	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize when the intermediate certificate includes a non-critical keyUsage extension.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 10.	Security – Mandatory
3.5.3 Invalid keyUsage Critical cRLSign False	V	Verify Product's ability to recognize when the intermediate certificate includes a critical keyUsage extension in which cRLSign is false.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 11.	Security – Mandatory

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126 **3.6 Certificate Policies**

127 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to correctly process **certificatePolicies** extension.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.6.1 Explicit Certificate Policy Required and Present	V	With the trust anchor set to Commercial Root check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and present in the certificate path. The explicit policy will be set to PIV-I Hardware.	Production PIV-I receives access grant.	Security – Mandatory
3.6.2 Explicit Certificate Policy Required and not Present	V	With the trust anchor set to Commercial Root check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and not present in the certificate path. The explicit policy will be set to an arbitrary value that is not present in the certificate path (e.g., OID value 1.2.3.4).	Production PIV-I receives access denied.	Security – Mandatory
3.6.3 Explicit Certificate Policy Required Across Bridge and Present in End Entity Certificate	V	With the trust anchor set so the certificate path requires trust across the Commercial Bridge to Federal Common Policy CA, check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and present in the certificate in a bridged trust environment. The explicit policy will be set to PIV-I Hardware. Test Condition: production PIV-I passes.	Production PIV-I receives access grant.	Security – Mandatory

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.6.4 Explicit Certificate Policy Required Across Bridge and not Present in End Entity Certificate	V	With the trust anchor set so the certificate path requires trust across the Commercial Bridge to Federal Common Policy CA, check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and not present in the certificate in a bridged trust environment. The explicit policy will be set to an arbitrary value that is not present in the certificate chain (e.g., OID value 1.2.3.4).	Production PIV-I receives access denied.	Security – Mandatory
3.6.5 Explicit Certificate Policy Required Across Bridge and Present in Path, but not Present in End Entity Certificate	V	With Federal Common Policy CA trust anchor, check to see if the validation software is able to recognize when an explicit certificate policy is required and not present in the certificate – however, is present somewhere in the certificate path. The explicit policy will be set to a value that is present in the certificate path, but does not map to the end entity certificate (e.g., High Hardware).	Production PIV-I receives access denied.	Security – Mandatory

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130 **3.7 Inhibit Policy Mappings**

131 The test in this section verifies the application's ability to process the **inhibitPolicyMapping** field of the
 132 **policyConstraints** extension and to verify that policy mappings are processed correctly after policy
 133 mapping has been inhibited.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.7.1 Invalid inhibitPolicyMapping	V	The first intermediate certificate asserts NIST-test-policy-1 and includes a policyConstraints extension with inhibitPolicyMapping set to 0. The second intermediate certificate asserts Policy A and maps Policy A to Policy B . The end entity certificate asserts Policy A and Policy B .	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 12.	Security – Mandatory

134 **3.8 Name Constraints**

135 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to correctly process **nameConstraints** extension.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.8.1 Valid DN nameConstraints	V	The system recognizes when the intermediate certificate includes a nameConstraints extension that specifies a single permitted subtree. The end entity certificate includes a subject name that falls within that subtree.	Card 1: (PIV Golden) access grant succeeds.	Security – Mandatory
3.8.2 Invalid DN nameConstraints	V	The system recognizes when the intermediate certificate includes a nameConstraints extension that specifies a single permitted subtree. The end entity certificate includes a subject name that falls outside that subtree.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 13.	Security – Mandatory

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.8.3 Invalid DN nameConstraints invalid SAN	V	The system recognizes when the intermediate certificate includes a nameConstraints extension that specifies a single permitted subtree. The end entity certificate includes a subject name that falls within that subtree and subjectAltName with a DN that falls outside that subtree.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 14.	Security – Mandatory

136 **3.9 Certificate Revocation Tests (CRL)**

137 Tests in this section verify the Product’s ability to retrieve and process valid revocation data for each
 138 certificate in the path via CRL.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.9.1 Unavailable CRL	V	The system recognizes when no revocation information is available for the End Entity certificate.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 15.	Security – Mandatory
3.9.2 Revoked CA	V	The system recognizes when a second intermediate CA certificate is revoked.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 16.	Security – Mandatory
3.9.3 Revoked End Entity	V	The system recognizes when the End Entity certificate is revoked.	Card 24: Revoked status.	Security – Mandatory
3.9.4 Invalid CRL Signature	V	The system recognizes when the CRL has an invalid signature	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 17	Security – Mandatory
3.9.5 Invalid CRL Issuer Name	V	The system recognizes when a certificate in the path links to a CRL issued by a CA other than that which issued the certificate.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 18.	Security – Mandatory
3.9.6 Old CRL nextUpdate	V	The system recognizes when a certificate in the path has an expired nextUpdate value.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 19.	(Security – Mandatory)

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.9.7 Invalid notBefore Date	V	The system recognizes when a certificate in the path points to a CRL with a notBefore Date in the future.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 20.	Security – Mandatory
3.9.8 Invalid Distribution Point	V	The system recognizes when a certificate in the path has an incorrect distribution point.	Card 1: (Golden PIV Card) fails access grant with Path 21.	Security – Mandatory

139 **3.10 CHUID Verification**

140 Tests in this section verify the system’s ability to correctly verify CHUID’s validity.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.10.1 Invalid CHUID signature	V	The system recognizes when the CHUID signature is invalid and does not verify.	Card 4: (Invalid CHUID Signature) fails access grant.	Security – Mandatory
3.10.2 Expired CHUID signer	V	The system recognizes when the CHUID signer certificate is expired.	Card 9: (Expired CHUID signer) fails access grant.	Security – Mandatory
3.10.3 Expired CHUID	V	The system recognizes when the CHUID is expired.	Card 14: (Card Expired) fails access grant.	Security – Mandatory
3.10.4 FASC-N != in CHUID	V	The system recognizes when the FASC-N in the CHUID does not equal the FASC-N in the PIV Auth Cert.	Card 15: (FASC-N in CHUID !=) fails access grant.	Security – Mandatory
3.10.5 UUID != in CHUID	V	The system recognizes when the UUID in the CHUID does not equal the UUID in the PIV Auth Cert.	Card 19: (UUID in CHUID !=) fails access grant.	Security – Mandatory

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143 **3.11 Facial Image Verification**

144 The test in this section verifies the Product’s ability to correctly verify Facial Image object. Test cards
 145 use CHUID Signer Certificate for biometric objects.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.11.1 Invalid Facial Image signature	V	The system recognizes when the Facial Image signature is invalid and does not verify.	Card 6: (bad photo signature) access grant fails.	Security – Optional

146 **3.12 FINGERPRINT Verification**

147 Tests in this section verify the Product’s ability to correctly verify FINGERPRINT object. Test cards use
 148 CHUID Signer Certificate for biometric objects.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.12.1 Invalid Fingerprint signature	V	The system recognizes when the Fingerprint signature is invalid and does not verify.	Card 7: (bad fingerprint signature) access grant fails.	Security – Mandatory
3.12.2 Valid Bio	H, V, R	With fingerprint checking enabled, a good credential is presented to the system with a valid fingerprint.	PIV-I access grant succeeds.	Security – Mandatory
3.12.3 Invalid Bio	H, V, R	With fingerprint checking enabled, a good credential is presented to the system with an invalid fingerprint.	PIV-I access grant fails.	Security – Mandatory

149 **3.13 Security Object Verification**

150 The test in this section verifies the Product’s ability to correctly verify Security Object.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.13.1 Invalid Security Object signature	V	The system recognizes when the Security Object signature is invalid and does not verify.	Card 8: (bad security object signature) access grant fails.	Security – Optional

151

152

153 **3.14 OCSF Response Checking**

154 Tests in this section verify the Product's ability to validate OCSF responses.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.14.1 Good OCSF Signer	V	The system successfully validates a good credential using an OCSF response with a good signature.	Card 1: Golden PIV is granted access.	Security – Mandatory
3.14.2 Expired OCSF Signer	V	Validation fails using an OCSF response with an expired signature for a good card.	Card 1: Golden PIV access is denied.	Security – Mandatory
3.14.3 Revoked OCSF Signer with PKIX_OCSP_NOCHECK present	V	Validation succeeds using an OCSF response with a revoked signature for a good card with PKIX_OCSP_NOCHECK present.	Card 1: Golden PIV is granted access.	Security – Mandatory
3.14.4 Revoked OCSF Signer with PKIX_OCSP_NOCHECK not present	V	Validation fails using an OCSF response with a revoked signature for a good card without PKIX_OCSP_NOCHECK present.	Card 1: Golden PIV access is denied.	Security – Mandatory
3.14.5 Invalid OCSF Signer	V	Validation fails using an OCSF response with an malformed signature for a good card.	Card 1: Golden PIV access is denied	Security – Mandatory

155 **3.15 Interoperability Testing**

156 Tests in this section attempt to use a variety of dual interface production PIV and PIV-I cards in the
 157 system. The FICAM Testing Program will vary the selection of cards on an as needed basis.

158 **3.16 Cryptographic Testing**

159 Tests in this section attempt to confirm the solution's ability to handle all required cryptographic
 160 algorithms as specified in the Federal PKI Common Policy and NIST SP800-78-3.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.16.1 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (1024)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (1024).	NIST card#7 access is granted.	Security – Mandatory
3.16.2 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048).	NIST card#1 access is granted.	Security – Mandatory

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.16.3 RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (3072)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (3072).	TBD	Security – Mandatory
3.16.4 RSASSA-PSS (1024)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSASSA-PSS (1024).	TBD (valid through 1/1/2014)	Security – Mandatory
3.16.5 RSASSA-PSS (2048)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSASSA-PSS (2048).	NIST card#2 access is granted.	Security – Mandatory
3.16.6 RSASSA-PSS (3072)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSASSA-PSS (3072).	TBD	Security – Mandatory
3.16.7 RSA key transport (1024)	V		TBD (valid through 1/1/2014)	Security – Mandatory
3.16.8 RSA key transport (2048)	V		TBD	Security – Mandatory
3.16.9 RSA key transport (3072)	V		TBD	Security – Mandatory
3.16.10 ECDSA (P-256)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using ECDSA (P-256)	NIST card#4 access is granted.	Security – Mandatory
3.16.11 ECDSA (P-384)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using ECDSA (P-384)	NIST card#5 access is granted in CHUID mode. TBD for PIV Auth.	Security – Mandatory
3.16.12 ECDH (P-256)	V		TBD	Security – Mandatory
3.16.13 ECDH (P-384)	V		TBD	Security – Mandatory
3.16.14 SHA-1	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using SHA-1	NIST card#7 access is granted.	Security – Mandatory
3.16.15 SHA-256	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using SHA-256	NIST card#1 access is granted.	Security – Mandatory
3.16.16 SHA-384	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using SHA-384	NIST card#5 access is granted.	Security – Mandatory
3.16.17 2TDEA	V	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using 2TDEA	TBD	Security - Optional*
3.16.18 3TDEA	V	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using 3TDEA	TBD	Security - Optional*

Comment [FICAM12]: Drop this requirement. In PACS, nothing encrypts to the card/person yet.

Comment [FICAM13]: Drop this requirement. In PACS, nothing encrypts to the card/person yet.

Comment [FICAM14]: Drop this requirement. In PACS, nothing encrypts to the card/person yet.

Comment [FICAM15]: We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of industry solutions that use the KMK for PACS. Are there live use cases for this key?

Comment [FICAM16]: We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of industry solutions that use the KMK for PACS. Are there live use cases for this key?

Comment [FICAM17]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?
 Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

Comment [FICAM18]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?
 Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.16.19 AES-128	V	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using AES-128	TBD	Security - Optional*
3.16.20 AES-192	V	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using AES-192	TBD	Security - Optional*
3.16.21 AES-256	V	Verify Product's ability for SYM-CAK using AES-256	TBD	Security - Optional*
3.16.22 RSA key exponent 65,537 (2^16+1)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048) w/exponent of 65,537.	NIST card#1 access is granted.	Security – Mandatory
3.16.23 RSA key exponent (2^256-1)	V	Verify Product's ability to validate signatures using RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048) w/exponent of 2^256-1.	TBD	Security – Optional*

Comment [FICAM19]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?

Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?


Comment [FICAM20]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?

Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

Comment [FICAM21]: Optional SYM-CAK. We anticipate dropping this requirement as we are unaware of interoperable solutions from industry that leverage SYM-CAK. Are there live interoperable solutions using this key?

Could also be used in TLS between infrastructure components. Is this done today?

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165 **3.17 Continuity of Operations Testing**

166 Tests in this section prove that the system can recover from a variety of environment conditions that
 167 could result in the loss of availability of service.

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.17.1 Network Connectivity Loss to Panel	H, V, R	The network connection is dropped to all boards within a panel.	Get an access grant at door with Test Card 1: PIV Golden. Disconnect network cables from panel and reattempt access with Test Card 1: PIV Golden. Access should be granted.	Usability - Optional
3.17.2 Network Connectivity Loss to Server	H, V, R	The network connection is dropped from the server(s).	Get an access grant at door with Test Card 1: PIV Golden. Disconnect network cable(s) from server(s) and reattempt access with Test Card 1: PIV Golden. Access should be granted.	Usability - Optional
3.17.3 Services Stopped on Server	H, V, R	The services have stopped on the server.	Get an access grant at door with Test Card 1: PIV Golden. Manually stop any service associated with the PACS on the server(s) and reattempt access with Test Card 1: PIV Golden. Access should be granted.	Usability - Optional

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
3.17.4 Power Loss to Panel	H, V, R	A/C Power loss to panel.	Get an access grant at door with Test Card 1: PIV Golden. Abruptly remove all power sources from the power supply. Restore power, and reattempt access with Test Card 1: PIV Golden. Access should be granted.	Usability - Optional

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169 **4 PACS Design Use Cases**

170 **4.1 Security Boundaries**

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
4.1.1 Attack side processing 1	H, V, R	"...all security relevant processing shall be performed on the secure side of the door." No security relevant decisions shall be made by system components that do not belong to the cardholder's credential when they are on the attack side of the door.	Confirm door controllers, head-end are capable of being located on the safe side of perimeter.	Security – Mandatory
4.1.2 Attack side processing 2	H, V, R	"...door reader shall be a transparent reader..."	Confirm physical inspection and design documentation.	Security – Mandatory
4.1.3 Attack side processing 3	H, V, R	"...compensating controls applied such as tamper switches and FIPS 140-2 certified cryptographic processing within the reader itself. Specific waivers shall be granted on a per implementation basis for Approved Products List (APL) approved compensating controls".	Document all supplemental security devices and check against APLs, FIPS 140-2.	Security – Optional

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173 **4.2 Registering Physical Access Privileges**

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
4.2.1 Populations 1	H	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> shall support, at a minimum, three specific groups: guests, visitors and regular access" shall be able to define: User populations: Guests, Visitors, Regular Access 	Confirm physical inspection and design documentation.	Usability - Optional
4.2.2 Populations 2	H	shall be able to define: Access points for each population.	Verify by system design review.	Usability - Optional
4.2.3 Populations 3	H	shall be able to define: Temporal access rules for each population.	Verify by system design review.	Usability - Optional
4.2.4 Populations 4	V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> shall be able to define: Challenge and verification program for each population shall be able to define: Authentication approach for each population and each zone/point of access in accord with NIST SP 800-116. 	Verify by system design review.	Usability - Optional
4.2.5 Valid Registration	V	No credential shall be registered for which there is no valid trust path per the relying party PKI policy.	Derive from the overall results of the PKI Use Cases found in section 2.	Security – Mandatory
4.2.6 Valid Registration 2	H, V	The system shall allow for integrated provisioning once a positive determination of a credential's suitability has been made.	Verify automated registration process for PIV credentials.	Usability - Optional

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
4.2.7 Valid Registration 3	H, V	The system shall allow for integrated provisioning once a positive determination of a credential's suitability has been made.	Verify automated registration process for all credentials.	Usability - Optional
4.2.8 Binding to Bearer 1	H, V, R	shall provide access grant functionality to evaluate credentials to determine binding with the bearer.	Use logs to verify that attempt to receive an access grant a good card with a correct biometric succeed, and attempts using an incorrect and improperly signed biometric fail.	Usability - Optional
4.2.9 Binding to Bearer 2	H, V	shall provide the means to select which biometrics are used to link bearer to credential.	Confirm multiple factors can be configured for access grant station.	Usability - Optional
4.2.10 Policy Constraints	V	shall provide the means to select which x.509 constraints are evaluated such as policy constraints, name constraints and key usage. This configuration will reflect the customer's PKI relying party policy.	Verify configurability of the path determination and validation component of the Product.	Usability - Optional
4.2.11 Workflow	H, V	Workflow shall include sponsor approval and security administrator approval; No credential shall be granted authorization privileges to a Trusted PACS without approval.	Confirm system design workflow. An administrative password must be utilized for system changes and enrollment.	Usability - Optional

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176 **4.3 Validation at Time of Access**

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
4.3.1 Signed CHUID	H, V, R	shall support: signed CHUID.	Use Authentication Test logs to verify that all good cards were allowed access at the door reader.	Usability - Optional
4.3.2 Card Authentication Key	H, V, R	shall support: Card Authentication Key.	Use Authentication Test logs to verify that all good cards were allowed access at the door reader.	Usability - Optional
4.3.3 PIV Authentication Key + PIN	H, V, R	shall support: PIV Authentication Key + PIN.	Use Authentication Test logs to verify that all good cards were allowed access at the door reader.	Usability - Optional
4.3.4 PIV Authentication Key + PIN + BIO	H, V, R	shall support: PIV Authentication Key + PIN + BIO.	Use Authentication Test logs to verify that all good cards with valid BIO available were allowed access at the door reader.	Usability - Optional
4.3.5 PIN to PACS	H, V	May support PIN to PACS secondary to other authentication mode.	If PIN to PACS available, verify that it must be tied to another authentication mode.	Usability - Optional

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179 **4.4 Portal Hardware**

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
4.4.1 Readers 1	H, V, R	Where multiple authentication modes are supported, readers shall support bidirectional communications with the system.	Confirmed using protocol sniffing, review of logs produced during authentication testing.	Security – Mandatory
4.4.2 Readers 2	H, V, R	For multi-factor readers, applicant’s system must allow modification of an individual reader or groups of readers’ authentication mode from the server or a client/workstation to the server.	Verify by system design review.	Usability - Optional
4.4.3 Readers 3	H, V, R	For multi-factor readers, the site administrator arbitrarily decides that all readers or a subset of readers must require either more or fewer authentication factors than the readers are presently configured for.	Verify by system design review.	Usability - Optional
4.4.4 Readers 4	H, V, R	For multi-factor readers, based on temporal access rules the administrator set, the system should support dynamic assignment of individuals (or groups of individuals) and resources (doors) on a time based schedule.	Verify by system design review.	Usability - Optional

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
4.4.5 Readers 5	H, V, R	For multi-factor readers, based on FPCON, MARCON or other similar structured emergency response protocol for which the vendor claims support, in no case shall there be a requirement for an administrator's physical presence at a reader be considered compliant.	Verify by system design review.	Usability - Optional
4.4.6 Readers 6	H, V, R	For multi-factor readers, if a time delay of longer than 120 seconds is required for a reader to change modes, this too shall be considered non-compliant.	Verify by system design review.	Usability - Optional

180 **4.5 Auditing and Logging**

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
4.5.1 Auditing 1	H, V	Verify by system design review.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.2 Auditing 2	H, V	Granularity of auditing records shall be to the card and individual transaction. These shall be easily verifiable through a reporting tool or any other log and audit viewing capability.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.3 Auditing 3	V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of all PKI processing to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nonce generation • Challenges • Responses • PDVAL • Revocation status checking. 	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory

Test	Components	Description	Test condition	Type
4.5.4 Auditing 4	H, V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of credential number processing and transmission.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.5 Auditing 5	H, V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of all software driven configuration changes.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.6 Auditing 6	V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of periodic certificate PDVAL and status checking.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.7 Auditing 7	H, V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of Card activity (e.g., 3 days of card activity).	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.8 Auditing 8	H, V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of a card's whereabouts in system.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.9 Auditing 9	V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of PKI policies for name constraints, path constraints, validity checks.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.10 Auditing 10	H	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of individual and group reporting of alarms (e.g., door force, door prop).	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.11 Auditing 11	H, V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of what date individuals were provisioned or de-provisioned and by whom.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.12 Auditing 12	H, V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of all readers and their modes.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory
4.5.13 Auditing 13	H, V	The Product shall provide auditing/logging of configuration download status to system components.	Verify by review of logs and reports.	Security – Mandatory

181 **4.6 Security Certification and Accreditation**

Test	Interface	Description	Test condition	Type
4.6.1 UL Assessment	H, V	Each component in the system shall have, at a minimum, a UL 249 listing.	Verify UL listing.	Usability - Optional
4.6.2 FIPS 201-1	H, V, R	Each component in the system shall have GSA FIPS-201-1 APL status, as applicable.	Verify APL listing.	Usability - Optional
4.6.3 FIPS 140-2	H, V, R	Each component in the system shall have FIPS 140-2 certification, as applicable.	Verify APL listing.	Security – Mandatory

182 **4.7 Biometric in PACS**

Test	Interface	Description	Test condition	Type
4.7.1 Biometric Encryption	H, V, R	Biometric identifiers shall be encrypted at rest and in transmission throughout the system.	Verify by system design and inspection of database.	Security – Mandatory

183 **4.8 Operational Controls**

Test	Interface	Description	Test condition	Type
4.8.1 System Configuration	H, V, R	The system shall have the ability to manage the system through software controlled configuration management methods. Initial configuration of hardware settings (e.g., DIP switches) is allowed at installation only and not for management of the hardware tree.	Verify by use of the system.	Usability - Optional
4.8.2 Component Addressing	H, V, R	Each physical component shall be separately defined and addressable within the server user interface.	Verify by setting up of system.	Usability - Optional
4.8.3 Configuration Downloads	H, V, R	The system shall support configuration downloads to each component.	Verify by setting up of system.	Usability - Optional

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